Regional growth in Europe: The role of European and national policies by Llussá, Fernanda & Lopes, José Mário
 1 
   
Regional Growth in Europe: 
The Role of European and National Policies * 
 
 
Fernanda Llussá 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa  
 
José Mário Lopes 
Cornell University 
 
 
 
November 2010 
   
 
Abstract 
 
 We conduct a systematic study of the impact of European Union (EU) regional 
policies on regional economic growth that controls for national policies and geographic 
characteristics. Special care is taken in distinguishing between the impact of EU policies 
and of national policies on economic growth. Our empirical study tries to answer two 
different questions. First, is there convergence across EU regions, and if so, do regions 
converge to a common European steady-state or to a national one? Second, how do 
European and national policies affect regional growth? We find evidence of regional 
convergence at the national level but not at the European level. In addition we find that 
trade openness at the national level is associated with regional convergence while 
European regional policies contribute, though weakly, to regional convergence. Our 
results suggest that policies that foster market integration – and convergence to a 
common steady-state - such as the promotion of labour and capital movements across 
countries and common regulatory policies are as important for European-wide regional 
convergence as regional structural funds. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The European Union is a major experience in the coordination of 
economic policies. As European economic integration progressed through the 
implementation of a single market for goods, services and capital and the 
centralization of monetary policy in a European Central Bank, it becomes 
evident the experience of the European Union will be closely watched by 
other potential projects of real and monetary integration. Structural policies, 
and in particular policies aimed at mitigating regional economic disparities, are 
a key element of European policy and will be determinant, in the long-run, to 
an evaluation of the EU´s role. Over the course of the 1990´s, spending on 
structural funds sums up to 6.5 percent of annual Community GDP. As way 
of comparison, the Marshall aid program to post-war Europe was equivalent 
to 1 percent of US GDP per year and amounted cumulatively, over the years 
between 1948 to 1951 to 4 percent of US GDP.1 
 A key issue is whether increased integration will augment or 
mitigate income differences between European regions. Clemente et al. 
(2009) highlight that integration in the EU, especially for new members, 
explain a substantial fraction of subsequent country growth but this effect 
diminishes over time. Andrés et al. (2004) argue that for the case of OECD, 
convergence may be a fixture of the fact that the long-run features of 
countries are becoming more similar, a possible effect of integration. In the 
case of the EU, there remain marked differences among regions. On the 
one hand, income per capita is twice as variable between EU regions as 
between US states, measured either in terms of standard deviation or the 
ratio of the top to bottom decile.
2
 Regional unemployment rates across EU 
regions vary by a factor of ten and more importantly, these differences are 
extremely persistent in time, unlike what occurs for the US. Easterly, 
                                                 
1 European Commission (2004). 
2 See Martin (2001). 
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Ritzen and Woolcock (2006) show that building social cohesion such as 
income inequality is crucial for having high quality institutions and vital for 
economic growth. The requirements for an optimal currency area, as 
proposed in Mundell (1961), include the transiency of regional shocks: in 
contrast, many EU regions have experienced a fall in demand which they 
failed to recover from, entering what some termed as ''structural 
depression''. The low levels and low responsiveness of inter-regional 
migration is certainly part of the problem. EU regional policy has 
responded to and tried to address some of these regional imbalances. The 
crucial issue is whether EU regional policies have contributed to inter-
regional convergence or not.
3
 
The study of economic geography highlights the importance of 
increasing returns and trade costs as explanations for the location of 
economic activity, as in Krugman (1991). European integration can be 
characterized by a decrease in transaction costs resulting in an increase in the 
effective size of the market that may further unbalance the distribution of 
economic activity across Europe. If agglomeration forces dominate, industrial 
and high human capital tertiary activities will tend to concentrate in a few 
locations. This uneven distribution of geographical activities - even if it were 
efficient - raises serious concerns so that Europe has devised regional policies 
to combat the economic backwardness of some regions and the decline of 
others. There are at least three important objectives as far as regional policies 
in the EU are concerned: support for regions that are well below average 
income per capita4, support for industrial regions that experience high 
unemployment and low employment growth and the incentive for agricultural 
regions to diversify.  
                                                 
3 National policies are naturally endogenous and depend on questions of social cohesion and 
income inequality, as ably pointed by Easterly et al. (2006), but here we will concentrate on the 
different roles of national and European polices, the novel issue at hand. 
4 The threshold used is 75 percent of average income per capita in the European Union. 
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This paper conducts the first systematic study of the impact of different 
objectives of EU regional policy that controls for both economic policies at 
the national level and the geographic characteristics of the regions themselves. 
We answer two different questions. First, does EU regional policy further 
regional convergence across European regions? Second, what is the role of 
national policies and how important are these relative to EU policy? The 
literature has attempted to answer the first and second questions, though the 
answers are far from conclusive. To our knowledge there is no explicit study 
of the second question, namely as it potentially clarifies the relative 
importance of national and European policies. The literature so far is 
characterized by the use of very few control variables at the regional level and 
almost none at the national level. The time frame and the set of 
countries/regions studied have been limited. Since it is the countries that 
acceded the EU last - Greece, Portugal and Spain - that have the poorest 
regions, their exclusion is highly problematic and has been shown to influence 
results on convergence. Lastly, previous papers have not addressed the 
relative merits of the different EU regional objectives, nor their impact on 
regional growth when compared to national policies. The paper is divided into 
a literature review and motivation in section 2, the presentation and discussion 
of the empirical results in section 3 and the conclusion. 
 
2. Regional Growth in the European Union 
2.1. Are EU Regions Converging? 
 There is an extensive literature on regional convergence in Europe. The 
conclusions are, at best, mixed. The seminal study by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1991) introduced ''Barro-type'' regressions to the analysis of regional 
convergence, with growth of income per capita explained by a set of control 
variables and the initial level of GDP. These authors examine regional growth 
in the 1950-1985 period, uncovering a convergence rate around 2% per year. 
 5 
This is in line with previous results for country convergence, as in Barro 
(1991). Their sample, however, excluded Greek, Portuguese and Spanish 
regions, leading to sample selection bias as those regions are precisely the least 
prosperous in the EU.5 Later studies have extended the Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1991) sample to include Spanish regions - as in Sala-i-Martin (1996) - 
and Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal - as in Armstrong (1995). 
These wider studies find a decrease in the convergence rate to 1.5 percent in 
the period 1950-1985 and 1 percent in 1970-1990, respectively. Carrington 
(2008) finds that while within neighborhoods of regions there was 
convergence at a rate close to the 2 percent mark in the cross-country 
literature, at the same time there was divergence between neighborhoods of 
regions, so the net convergence effect is close to nil. Other studies, such as 
Canova and Marcet (1995), which use fixed-effects estimators, find strong 
evidence of converging regional income levels. De la Fuente (2002) uses the 
same type of fixed-effects estimator and also finds high rates of regional 
convergence in the Spanish Regions.6 In sum, regional convergence among 
European regions seems weaker than country convergence and seems to have 
decreased over time. 
Another possible shortcoming of the papers above is their strong 
restrictions on the structure of the parameters, the ``Barro-type'' approach by 
assuming identical parameters in all regions and the fixed-effects estimator by 
allowing for differences in the intercept but nowhere else. Meliciani and 
Peracchi (2006) use median unbiased estimators of the regional convergence 
rate, estimating separate processes for each region, thus allowing for the 
model parameters to differ across regions. Compared to previous studies, they 
find a lower rate of convergence, zero for most regions. Twenty five out of 
ninety nine regions display positive convergence and these regions tend to be 
                                                 
5 And convergence may be stronger among already relatively prosperous regions, as suggested by 
the study of country convergence, where OECD countries experience stronger convergence than a 
more heterogeneous sample of countries. 
6 Both these two studies estimate rates of convergence for national (or even regional) steady-states. 
 6 
located in the poor periphery: they are the Portuguese regions with the 
exception of the Algarve, Extremadura and Castilla-y-Léon in Spain, the 
Scottish regions and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, and a few 
regions in the south of Italy and the Center and West of France. 
 
2.2. The Role of Country Policies 
 A second important issue is to assess the role of national policies for 
convergence across European regions. If the poorer countries in the EU 
pursue policies known to foster country growth, it is likely this will decrease 
divergence in income per capita among European regions. The potential 
importance of national policies for regional growth is suggested by the fact 
that regions in the same country tend to display similar growth rates, unlike 
what occurs between neighboring regions across national borders, as shown in 
Meliciani and Peracchi (2006).7 Ertur et al. (2006) analyze 138 European 
regions in the 1980 - 1995 time span.8 They consider spatial correlation in the 
growth process of European regions and find that the average growth of a 
region is positively influenced by those of neighboring regions. 
A strong intra-country correlation in regional growth rates may indicate 
that the diffusion of technology is mostly undertaken at the national level. But 
it also suggests there are common policies, at the national level, that strongly 
influence regional growth. Investment is one such policy. De la Fuente 
(2002a) suggests that public investment and education policies can advance 
regional convergence among Spanish regions. This author highlights the 
importance of employment performance to absorb the surplus of agricultural 
workers freed in poor regions as structural transformation proceeds.9 
                                                 
7 Meliciani and Peracchi (2006) find strong evidence in favor of homogeneity in growth rates within 
the same country. Most French differ in trend growth rates from Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Irish 
and Luxembourg regions. 
8 The countries considered are Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Greece, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Denmark. 
9 Martinéz-Lopez (2001) finds that public capital indeed enhances private investment. 
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In this study we consider different indicators of public and private 
expenditures that may have an impact on GDP growth. We consider 
government expenditure (including government subsidies and government 
consumption) as a share of GDP as a control variable. Countries with strong 
regional governments are likely to have a fair amount of subsidies granted by 
the central to the local governments and these may affect growth performance 
at the regional level. Subsidies granted to firms and individuals (for instance, 
the unemployed) may also have an important regional component. The same 
is true for government consumption, made up in the most part by public wage 
disbursements: in poorer regions of Italy, Spain and Portugal, for instance, 
public employment is a form of subsidizing the local economy. This may be 
positive or negative as far as growth is concerned. Adding the share of 
investment in GDP to our specification - including both private and public 
investment - controls for the role of capital formation in regional growth. 
Private investment may be encouraged (or substituted) by the disbursement of 
EU funds. On the other hand, public investment can also be affected in either 
direction. We also consider trade openness10 and school enrollment at the 
primary level, an indicator of a country's commitment to education.11 
 
2.3. Is There a Role for European Regional Policy? 
 Regional support is a key area in EU economic policy. The European 
Union has six major financial instruments to implement structural policies: the 
Regional Development Fund, the Social Fund, the EAGGF-Guidance fund, 
the Fisheries financial instrument, the Cohesion Fund and loans from the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). The structural funds operate within a 
common framework and, while initially allocated according to quotas, after 
1989 a new system was put in place and clearer objectives were formulated. 
                                                 
10 An important recent paper which models endogenous growth to examine how fiscal policy 
relates to economic growth is Dhont and Heylen (2008). 
11 A relevant issue is the degree of disaggregation. Boldrin and Canova (2000) discuss the use of 
NUTS1 to NUTS3 and consider none fully satisfactory as an aggregation level 
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The disbursement of funds around three specific objectives that are defined at 
the regional level use up to 85 percent of the global funding available. 
Objective 1 intends to promote an increase in income per capita in regions 
with less than 75 percent of European Union income and uses up to 70 
percent of total funds available. Objective 2 is directed at propping up regions 
in severe industrial decline - with high unemployment levels and low 
employment growth – and uses about 11% percent of funds. Finally, 
Objective 5b is directed at rural regions with sparse population, using 4 
percent of total funds.12 
The resources available for these policies have increased dramatically, from 
3.7 billion ECU in 1985 to 18.3 billion ECU in 1992 and then to 33 billion 
ECU in 1999, a dramatic almost ten-fold increase in just 15 years.  This 
funding now represents about a third of total European Union expenditures 
and 0.45 percent of the EU´s gross domestic product.13 Objective 1 funding is 
by far the most important regional disbursement and Portugal and Greece its 
main beneficiaries, followed by Spain and Italy. National matching funds 
constitute about half of total funds directed at the regions, and about two 
thirds of that are public matching funds. In addition to determining a large 
share of the EU budget, funds to European regions are also a very visible EU 
policy in all the beneficiary countries. Given its clear and stated objectives of 
promoting the development of the poorest European regions, it is important 
to evaluate and quantify, if possible, the impact these funds on regional 
growth and convergence across European regions.  
Most of the studies on the growth of European regions have so far 
been conducted at the national level, and explicitly neglected the study of 
policies at both the regional and national levels. Others seem to have lumped 
                                                 
12 Together they attribute 15 percent of the funding. Objective 3 focuses on long-term and youth 
unemployment, Objective 4 assists in the adaptation of workers to industrial change, and Objective 
5a promotes adjustment in the agricultural and fisheries sectors.  
13 Cappelen et al. (2003) report that the average region in the EU received regional support of 
around 0.23 percent of income between 1980 and 1984, and 0.53 percent between 1989 and 1993. 
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together structural funds and physical capital, failing to distinguish between 
the two.14 De La Fuente (2002b) produced a first evaluation of the impact of 
EU's regional funds by examining the 1994 - 1999 Objective 1 Community 
Support Framework. This author makes strong assumptions concerning the 
relation between EU funds and the levels of public and private regional 
investment, namely that EU structural funds have the same impact as national 
investment of a similar nature.15 He then uses an aggregate production 
function that depends on regional employment and the regional stocks of 
infrastructure, as well as physical capital and education, and shows that 
structural funds have a positive net contribution to convergence among 
Spanish regions. 
 Our study brings forth several distinct contributions. First, unlike 
previous studies, we examine convergence among European regions by 
highlighting the implications of considering a common steady-state level of 
per capita income, as opposed to a country-specific steady-state. As will 
become clear, this is a key assumption as far as empirical results go. Second, 
we consider different EU regional policy objectives to assess the relative merit 
of different policies. Thirdly, we explicitly estimate the regional impact of 
European and national policies.  
 
3. Empirics 
3.1. Data and Descriptive analysis 
    We have assembled a dataset combining information on economic and 
geographic indicators at the regional level – such as income per capita, income 
per capita growth, and indicators for border and non-border regions, for 
instance -, economic indicators at the national level – such as the degree of 
openness and primary school enrollment -, and, finally, indicator variables on 
                                                 
14 Such is the case in Roeger (1996). 
15 The author suggests this may not be true as the lower cost of funds in European projects may 
encourage investments that do not yield positive net marginal value. 
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regional eligibility to different European Union regional policy initiatives. The 
basic data comes from the REGIO dataset at EUROSTAT, the most 
comprehensive source of regional data on economic and geographical 
indicators. The data covers a total of 194 NUTS 2 level European regions,16 in 
the period from 1989 to 1999. The choice of time period is key. As mentioned 
above, in 1989 a completely new system came into place, when clearer 
objectives were formulated for the use of regional funds. We focus on the 
three policy objectives with clear regional content. Objective 1 is aimed at 
regions lagging behind in terms of GDP per capita, defined as regions where 
GDP per capita is lower than 75 percent of the Community average. 
Objective 2 supports regions in industrial decline, as indicated by high 
unemployment and low employment growth. Objective 5b aims at rural 
regions, identified by a high share of employment in agriculture and GDP per 
capita.17 Regions eligible for Objective 1 comprise 24 percent of all regions, as 
compared with 35 percent for Objective 2 and 44 percent for Objective 5. 
Figure 1 plots the standard deviation of regional per capita income in 
the European Union against the dates of its successive enlargement. In 
general enlargement has increased regional diversity through the 
accommodation of less developed peripheral regions in Southern Europe – 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain - and later, highly developed but also in a way 
peripheral regions in Sweden and Finland. As documented, income disparity 
at the regional increased substantial in the mid-1980´s and has then remained 
at the higher levels throughout. 
 
                                                 
16 That is: 11 for Belgium, 1 for Denmark, 37 for Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for Spain, 22 for 
France, 20 for Italy, 1 for Luxembourg, 12 for Netherlands, 9 for Austria, 7 for Portugal, 6 for 
Finland, 6 for Sweden and 31 for the UK. 
17 Analyzing regional eligibility for each objective rather than the amount of funds disbursed allows 
us to circumvent the issue of the interaction of EU and national investment. Extreme assumptions 
such as the perfect substitutability between EU and national funds as far as their effects on growth 
are not made. Rather we analyze the impact of eligibility on regional performance, as opposed to 
the amount and quality of funds disbursed. In this manner we attempt to evaluate the role of the 
EU policy itself, rather than the specific nature of the flow of funds to the regions.. 
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  Table 1 below presents data on the growth rate of real GDP in our sample 
between the years 1989 and 1999. As can be verified, the economies of the 
poorer regions – Eligible for Objective 1 - have grown at lower average rates, 
and subject to higher standard deviation than other regions. Regions in 
industrial decline and eligible for rural diversification programmes grow at 
higher than average rates. These basic statistics are suggestive of regional 
income divergence as the poorest regions grow at slower rates. True to data in 
Boldrin and Canova (2000), regions not covered by any goal at all have 
performed relatively well. In general, there seems to be a higher degree of 
within-group dispersion for groups that performed poorly, suggesting that 
higher performance regions also tend to become less heterogeneous.  
Table 2 below presents data for different EU regions, classified 
according to their geographical characteristics.18 We find that regions located 
                                                 
18 Around 53 percent of the European regions are on the coast, and 7 percent include the country's 
capital city. While 46 percent are considered geographically at the core, 30 percent are in the 
periphery.  
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in “core areas”19 display higher growth rates, especially if on the coast, while 
peripheral regions present poorer performance levels, especially when in the 
case where they share a border with a non-EU member. This also points to a 
lack of unconditional convergence across geographical lines. 
 
Table 1 
Income per capita Growth Across European Regions  
By Policy Eligibility 
1989- 1999 
 
Note: The Appendix describes data and sources. For the period 1989 to 1994 we have 155 NUTS 2 
level European regions: 11 NUTS for Belgium, 1 for Denmark, 31 for Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for 
Spain, 22 for France, 20 for Italy,  1 for Luxembourg, 12 for Netherlands , 9 for Austria, 7 for Portugal, 
4 for Finland and 6 for Sweden. For the period 1995 to 1999 we have 194 NUTS 2 level European 
regions: 11 NUTS for Belgium, 1 for Denmark, 37 for Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for Spain, 22 for 
France, 20 for Italy, 1 for Luxembourg, 12 for Netherlands, 9 for Austria, 7 for Portugal, 6 for Finland, 
6 for Sweden and 31 for the UK. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 The concept of "core" regions is not exempt of discussion. Though history matters for 
concentration of economic activity, there is evidence that industry mobility can overcome history, 
as in Barrios and Strobl (2004). About a third of the regions border regions from other European 
Union country and only 16 percent border regions from a non-European Union country. 
 5-year Annualized Real GDP Growth Rates  
1989 – 1999 
 N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
      
All  European Regions 
                  NUTS II Definition   328 1.24% 4.07% -19.39% 7.79% 
Less Developed  
                  Eligible for Goal 1 89 -0.61% 5.70% -19.39% 7.80% 
Industrial Decline  
                  Eligible for Goal 2 113 1.96% 1.79% -3.66% 5.88% 
Rural Diversification  
                  Eligible for Goal 5 142 1.93% 1.68% -3.66% 6.80% 
Both Goal 2 and Goal 5  81 1.86% 1.78% -3.66% 5.78% 
Any Goal 258 1.09% 3.81% -19.39% 7.80% 
No Goal 70 1.78% 4.87% -10.89% 7.43% 
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Table 2 
Income per capita Growth Across European Regions  
By Geographical Characteristics 
1989- 1999 
 
Note: The Table shows estimates for the Core and Periphery regions only. The Appendix describes 
data and sources. For the period 1989 to 1994 we have 155 NUTS 2 level European regions: 11 NUTS 
for Belgium, 1 for Denmark, 31 for Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for Spain, 22 for France, 20 for Italy,  
1 for Luxembourg, 12 for Netherlands , 9 for Austria, 7 for Portugal, 4 for Finland and 6 for Sweden. 
For the period 1995 to 1999 we have 194 NUTS 2 level European regions: 11 NUTS for Belgium, 1 
for Denmark, 37 for Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for Spain, 22 for France, 20 for Italy, 1 for 
Luxembourg, 12 for Netherlands, 9 for Austria, 7 for Portugal, 6 for Finland, 6 for Sweden and 31 for 
the UK. 
 
 
3.2 Econometric analysis 
We analyze the determinants of regional income growth by estimating a 
Ordinary Least Squares specification where regional income is determined by 
initial income per capita, national policies, and eligibility to European regional 
policies under Objectives 1, 2, and 5b, as explained above. The general 
specification can be summarized as: 
tiititi
tititititi
dummiesCountrybObjectiveObjectiveObjectiveTrade
SchoolingInvGovGDPpcgrowth
,32,1,5
,.4,3,2,1,
5.2.1..
.exp.)log(.
εγγγβ
ββββα
++++++
+++++=
 
 Core Periphery 
   
All  2.57% -1.32% 
Number of NUTS 2 Regions 149 111 
   
Regions that Border other EU 
Region 1.68% 0.22% 
Number of NUTS 2 Regions 64 26 
   
Regions that Border Non EU 
Region 2.46% -2.57% 
Number of NUTS 2 Regions 14 16 
   
Regions with Coast 3.24% -1.37% 
Number of NUTS 2 Regions 38 93 
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where yearly data is averaged for each 5-year period between 1989 and 1999.20 
The index i denotes the region and t the observation year. Income per capita, 
GDPpci,t is the logarithm of regional real income per capita at time t. The 
independent variables in the equation include indicators of national policies 
related to economic growth, such as the share of government expenditure – 
Govexp – , share of investment (private plus public) – Inv – , the rate of 
primary school enrolment as a share of the eligible cohort – , Schooling – , and 
trade openness measured as the share of exports plus imports in GDP – 
Trade. National policies vary with time and across countries, but not across 
regions of the same country. Objective1, Objective2, and Objective5b are dummy 
variables signalling regional eligibility for each of the three regional 
components of structural funding. We also introduce country dummies, when 
noted. One can understand national policies and eligibility to EU regional 
policies as fundamentally exogenous to the region.  
We first estimated a specification for the whole sample of European 
regions and then estimated the same specification for subsamples of these 
regions, defined either by geography or by eligibility for EU regional policy 
initiatives. Table 3 presents the basic specification without country dummies. 
As can be verified, the positive and significant coefficient on initial income 
suggests that there is regional income divergence at the EU level. The positive 
coefficient on initial income is also present - and quantitatively more 
significant – for the Objective 1 subsample suggests that it is the poorer regions 
in the European Union that drive the non-convergence result. The even 
higher positive coefficient for the Any Objective subsample reinforces this 
result. The negative and significant coefficient estimates for the Objective 2, 
Objective 5b subsamples suggest convergence for subgroups of regions. The 
very significant and negative coefficient estimate of -3.53 for regions which 
are not eligible for any regional support policy strongly points towards 
                                                 
20 A more detailed definition of each variable is available in the Appendix. 
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convergence for this subgroup of relatively richer regions, which is consistent 
with a view of regional income growth in the EU as being driven by 
convergence clubs.21 Of the national policies considered, only trade openness 
seems to have a positive and significant effect on regional growth. 
 
Table 3 
Determinants of Regional Income in the European Union  
No Country Dummies 
1989- 1999 
Dependent variable: 
 Real GDP  
5 yr. avg growth rate  
All 
Regions 
Objective 1 
Eligibility 
Objective 2 
Eligibility 
Objective 5b 
Eligibility 
Any 
Eligibility 
No 
Eligibility 
       
Log (GDPt-1) 1.35 *** 1.64 *** -1.14 ** -1.74 *** 1.98 *** -3.53 *** 
  0.49 0.53 0.57 0.47 0.46 1.20 
       
Gov. Expenditures -0.23 *** -0.59 *** -0.06 ** -0.07 ** -0.30 *** 0.15 
  0.05 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.14 
       
Investment -0.63 *** -1.12 *** -0.65 *** -0.65 *** -0.70 *** -1.83 *** 
  0.07 0.21 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.18 
       
Prim. School 0.14 ** 0.49 *** -0.06 -0.11 *** 0.26 *** -0.97 *** 
  0.06 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.10 
       
Trade 0.04 *** 0.13 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.09 *** 
  0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 
       
Constant -3.92 -21.10 *** 33.16 *** 43.39 *** -15.94 ** 152.00 *** 
  8.06 7.38 7.64 6.55 7.31 21.22 
        
Country dummies No No No No No No 
N 328 89 113 142 258 70 
F 17.65 8.53 25.50 22.52 14.44 32.72 
pvalue F test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.24 0.43 0.55 0.48 0.35 0.66 
       
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. The Appendix describes data and 
sources. For the period 1989 to 1994 we have 155 NUTS 2 level European regions: 11 NUTS for 
Belgium, 1 for Denmark, 31 for Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for Spain, 22 for France, 20 for Italy,  1 
for Luxembourg, 12 for Netherlands , 9 for Austria, 7 for Portugal, 4 for Finland and 6 for Sweden. 
For the period 1995 to 1999 we have 194 NUTS 2 level European regions: 11 NUTS for Belgium, 1 
for Denmark, 37 for Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for Spain, 22 for France, 20 for Italy, 1 for 
Luxembourg, 12 for Netherlands, 9 for Austria, 7 for Portugal, 6 for Finland, 6 for Sweden and 31 for 
the UK. 
                                                 
21 See Quah (1996 and 1997). 
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Table 4 presents results for the same exact specification as Table 3, but 
adding country dummies. Ezcurra et al.(2005) present empirical evidence 
strongly suggesting that regional disparity in productivity in the European 
Union are due to differences across regions and the fundamental role of the 
country differences in income per worker. The difference with Table 3 is 
stark: where we found evidence of regional income divergence, we now find 
strong evidence of income convergence. For the complete sample and for all 
the subsamples we now obtain negative estimates of the coefficient on initial 
income. Only in the case of Objective 2 eligibility the estimate is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. For the sample of all regions, for regions 
eligible for Objective 1, and for regions eligible for any EU regional  policy, 
the coefficient on initial income is strongly negative, more so than for 
equivalent country studies.22 This suggests that, after controlling for country 
characteristics – including the long run steady-state level of income per capita 
–, there is indeed strong regional income convergence to the country average 
income. This is especially true for regions that are eligible for Objective 1 
policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 As well as previous studies of regional convergence among states in the United States of America 
and regions in Japan. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991 and 1995). 
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Table 4 
Determinants of Regional Income in the European Union  
With Country Dummies 
1989- 1999 
 Dependent variable: 
Real GDP 5-year 
average growth rate  
All 
Regions 
Objective 1 
Eligibility 
Objective 2 
Eligibility 
Objective 5b 
Eligibility 
Any 
Eligibility 
No 
Eligibility 
       
Log (GDPt-1) -3.07 *** -5.43 *** -1.18 -1.97 *** -3.93 *** -1.36 
  0.55 1.39 0.83 0.63 0.60 0.86 
       
Gov. Expenditures -0.84 *** -0.97 *** 0.00 -0.11 -0.86 *** -0.85 *** 
  0.08 0.18 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.17 
       
Investment -1.71 *** -1.93 *** 0.21 * 0.03 -1.62 *** -1.50 *** 
  0.18 0.41 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.41 
       
Prim. School -0.25 ** 0.11 -0.21 ** -0.31 *** -0.10 -0.14 *** 
  0.12 0.25 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.11 
       
Trade 0.20 *** -0.08 0.47 *** 0.43 *** -0.03 0.48 *** 
  0.05 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.11 
       
Constant 107.43 *** 136.21 *** 6.85 -27.68 124.87 *** 35.97 
  15.19 34.60 12.99 17.08 21.48 35.80 
        
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 328 89 113 142 258 70 
F . 54.11 . . . . 
pvalue F test . 0.00 . . . . 
R-squared 0.83 0.92 0.81 0.75 0.84 0.96 
 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.  The Appendix describes data and 
sources. For the period 1989 to 1994 we have 155 NUTS 2 level European regions: 11 NUTS for 
Belgium, 1 for Denmark, 31 for Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for Spain, 22 for France, 20 for Italy,  1 
for Luxembourg, 12 for Netherlands , 9 for Austria, 7 for Portugal, 4 for Finland and 6 for Sweden. 
For the period 1995 to 1999 we have 194 NUTS 2 level European regions: 11 NUTS for Belgium, 1 
for Denmark, 37 for Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for Spain, 22 for France, 20 for Italy, 1 for 
Luxembourg, 12 for Netherlands, 9 for Austria, 7 for Portugal, 6 for Finland, 6 for Sweden and 31 for 
the UK. 
 
 
Figure 2 displays the correlation between the log of initial GDP and the 
GDP growth rate inside each country. First notice that the unconditional 
correlation coefficient for all European regions is positive and significant and 
it is above 0.2, suggesting divergence across European regions. However, the 
picture totally changes once we look at the same correlation coefficient for 
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regions within each European country. Now we find that most countries 
display negative and quantitatively significant correlations between initial 
income and income growth at the regional level, most below -0.2. The 
exceptions are the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Belgium with 
weakly positive correlation coefficients, below 0.2, and France, with a weakly 
negative coefficient. This confirms a key result in our analysis, namely that 
there is evidence of regional income convergence within countries, while at 
the European level there is evidence of the opposite. This suggests that 
policies directed at raising the national steady-state levels of national income 
can do a lot for regional income convergence. 
Ezcurra and Pascual (2005) show that, in spite of some convergence in 
income distribution across European regions, the European regions 
maintained their relative positions in terms of inequality over time, suggesting 
the importance of the national component in explaining regional distribution 
of inequality.23 The introduction of country dummies, as in our case, corrects 
for these stable national differences in income distribution. Ezcurra (2009) 
shows that income polarization is negatively related to economic growth 
across Europe´s regions. This suggests that the introduction of country 
dummies will correct for different average growth rates, insofar as countries 
differ in income distribution, and might reveal regional income dynamics that 
are disguised national dynamics.  
     Also, Giannetti (2001) provides an explanation for the coexistence of 
convergence across countries and the lack thereof at the regional level in the 
European Union. Her model and empirical evidence support the view that 
regions specialized in advanced sectors at the beginning of the sample period 
became more similar in terms of per capita income, i.e. converge, while 
regions specialized in traditional sectors lag behind, growing at lower rates. 
                                                 
23 Giannetti (2001) suggests that the intensification of international knowledge spillovers due to 
more cross-country interaction may exacerbate within-country regional disparities, if regions with 
different specialization do not benefit evenly from the exchange of knowledge.  
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Figure 2 
Correlation Between Initial Income and Income Growth at the 
Regional Level 
1989 - 1999 
 
 
Our first important result is thus the evidence in favor of regional 
income convergence to average country income levels, not to European Union 
average income levels. 
 We now consider different geographical characteristics and study 
regional income convergence across different regional groupings. The 
geographical characteristics considered are whether the region is on the coast 
– Coast -, whether it shares a land border with regions from other countries, 
EU or non-EU - noted respectively as BorderEU and BorderNonEU – as well as 
whether the region is considered in the European core or the periphery – 
respectively Core and Periphery.24 Again we find strong evidence of regional 
income convergence in the benchmark specification with country dummies. 
                                                 
24 The European Union itself provides the classification of regions into Core – which it names 
Center -, Periphery and Neither Core nor Periphery, and is based on geographical location alone 
and not derived from the eligibility to funding criteria. The Core roughly includes Belgium, 
Holland, Luxembourg, Northeastern France, Southeastern United Kingdom and Northwestern 
Germany. See European Commission (2001). 
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It is important to interpret our results in light of Ezcurra et al. (2006), 
who examined regional specialization in the European Union. These authors 
find that specialization levels, though relatively persistent, decreased between 
1977 and 1999. Moreover, there is evidence of convergence in regional 
specialization, mostly due to small regions in southern Europe with a high 
level of specialization at the beginning of the period that tend towards the 
European average. Our results are consistent with Ezcurra et al. (2006) once 
we consider that regional specialization levels are highly correlated with a 
country´s level of development. In that case, once country dummies are 
introduced, as we do, evidence of regional income convergence might result. 
Ezcurra et al. (2006) show that the size of the region, the ease of market 
access, and its geographical location are key to explaining the degree of 
regional specialization. Results in Table 5, which consider different regional 
groupings related to geographic characteristics and market access, confirm the 
existence of regional income convergence for those groupings. The lack of 
overall income convergence in the case where no country fixed effects are 
taken into account, as in our Table 2, is consistent with Ezcurra et al. (2006) 
contention that the trend toward convergence in productive specialization 
changed during the 1900s, with evidence of increasing differences in regional 
productive structures. 
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Table 5 
Determinants of Regional Income in the European Union  
Across Geographical Characteristics 
With Country Dummies 
1989- 1999 
Dependent variable: 
Real GDP growth rate 
(5-year average) 
All 
Regions Coast 
Border 
EU 
Border 
Non-EU Core Periphery 
       
Log (GDPt-1) -3.07 *** -3.36 *** -2.51 ***  -3.40 *** -1.65 ** -2.12 ** 
  0.55 0.94 0.84 0.94 0.77 1.02 
Gov. Expenditures -0.84 *** -1.11 *** -0.15 * -0.97 *** -0.22 *** -0.82 *** 
  0.08 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.21 
Investment -1.71 *** -1.50 *** -0.50 ** -1.37 *** -0.52 -3.17 *** 
  0.18 0.18 0.22 0.28 0.35 0.52 
Prim. School -0.25 ** -0.36 * -0.15 0.58 *** -0.30 ** -0.34 
  0.12 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.21 
Trade 0.20 *** 0.36 *** 0.29 *** 0.47 ***  -0.08 -0.10 
  0.05 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.30 0.14 
Constant 107.43 *** 114.69 *** 39.41 ** 22.98 70.75 ** 172.64 *** 
  15.19 18.89 17.37 24.65 35.45 29.72 
              
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
N 328 163 119 53 148 106 
F . 61.11 . . . 92.77 
pvalue F test . 0.00000 . . . 0.00000 
R-squared 0.83 0.89 0.63 0.97 0.58 0.92 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. The Appendix describes data and sources. 
For the period 1989 to 1994 we have 155 NUTS 2 level European regions: 11 NUTS for Belgium, 1 
for Denmark, 31 for Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for Spain, 22 for France, 20 for Italy,  1 for 
Luxembourg, 12 for Netherlands , 9 for Austria, 7 for Portugal, 4 for Finland and 6 for Sweden. For 
the period 1995 to 1999 we have 194 NUTS 2 level European regions: 11 NUTS for Belgium, 1 for 
Denmark, 37 for Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for Spain, 22 for France, 20 for Italy, 1 for Luxembourg, 
12 for Netherlands, 9 for Austria, 7 for Portugal, 6 for Finland, 6 for Sweden and 31 for the UK. 
 
 
Table 6 reruns the benchmark specification for different eligibility 
groups - respectively by Objective 1, Objective 2 and Objective 5b, and the 
subsample of regions that are eligible for at least one of the three regional 
policies. We now add interaction terms between GDP and each of the Objective  
dummies. In this way we assess whether eligibility adds to or detracts from the 
regional income convergence. The coefficient on initial income for a specific 
region must now be read as the simple sum of the coefficient on initial 
income and the coefficient on the applicable interaction term coefficient. As 
can be verified, the fact that a region is covered by one of the EU policies 
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always contributes to convergence, though the effect is relatively weak. This is 
the case in the specification in column 4, where all the interactions are 
considered and all come out with a negative and significant coefficient.25 
 
Table 6 
Determinants of Regional Income in the European Union  
With Country Dummies 
Initial GDP and EU Regional Policy Eligibility Interacted 
1989- 1999 
Dependent variable: 
Real GDP growth 
rate (5-year average) 
Objective 1 
Eligibility 
Objective 2 
Eligibility  
Objective 5b 
Eligibility Any Eligibility 
     
Log (GDPt-1) -3.64 *** -2.99 *** -2.98 *** -3.82 *** 
  0.65 0.56 0.55 0.65 
Gov. Expenditures -0.81 *** -0.84 *** -0.84 *** -0.80 *** 
  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Investment -1.69 *** -1.72 *** -1.72 *** -1.68 *** 
  0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Prim. School -0.23 * -0.26 ** -0.26 ** -0.22 * 
  0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 
Trade 0.19 *** 0.20 *** 0.20 *** 0.19 *** 
  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Goal1_GDP -0.09 **   -0.20 *** 
  0.04   0.05 
Goal2_GDP  -0.02  -0.06 ** 
   0.03  0.03 
Goal5_GDP   -0.03 -0.09 *** 
    0.03 0.03 
Constant 109.50 *** 107.11 *** 107.34 *** 110.87 *** 
  15.30 15.25 15.17 15.00 
      
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 328 328 328 328 
F . . . . 
pvalue F test . . . . 
R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. The Appendix describes data and sources. For the 
period 1989 to 1994 we have 155 NUTS 2 level European regions: 11 NUTS for Belgium, 1 for Denmark, 31 for 
Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for Spain, 22 for France, 20 for Italy,  1 for Luxembourg, 12 for Netherlands , 9 for 
Austria, 7 for Portugal, 4 for Finland and 6 for Sweden. For the period 1995 to 1999 we have 194 NUTS 2 level 
European regions: 11 NUTS for Belgium, 1 for Denmark, 37 for Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for Spain, 22 for 
France, 20 for Italy, 1 for Luxembourg, 12 for Netherlands, 9 for Austria, 7 for Portugal, 6 for Finland, 6 for 
Sweden and 31 for the UK. 
 
                                                 
25
 Running the specifications in Table 6 without country dummies delivers non-significant coefficients on 
the interacted terms, suggesting that EU regional policy indeed has little effect as regards income 
convergence to a common EU level. See Table 6a in the Appendix. 
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In conclusion, we can say that regional convergence is happening 
within countries, but not across different EU countries and we can say that 
national policies that lead to greater expenditure fail to foster growth. Trade 
openness, however, emerges as having a robust positive effect on regional 
growth. As for EU policies, they appear to foster convergence within 
countries, but not across all EU regions. In general, the evidence is consistent 
with the idea of regional income convergence clubs, defined either by 
geographical characteristics, eligibility and, most importantly, nationality.  
  These results are in line with De La Fuente (2002b) who shows that 
structural funds have contributed to convergence among Spanish regions.  
Thus, we argue against Cappelen et al. (2003), who display evidence of catch-
up between countries but not within countries. Martin (2001) has documented 
relatively low levels of beta-convergence across EU regions, though no 
explicit consideration of the role of regional policy is present.26 His survey of 
the evidence suggests that, while there was regional convergence in the EU 
between the 1950's and the 1970's, after 1980 convergence came to a halt.27 
Our results are also in line with Boldrin and Canova (2000), who argue that 
trade integration has a positive effect o regional growth. 
 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper we used a dataset on regional macroeconomic indicators 
and the incidence of European Union regional policies for a wide sample of 
European regions at NUTS 2 level. For the period 1989-1999 covered in our 
study, we find no evidence of regional income convergence, except when one 
takes into account the country where the region is located. In our view, this 
signals that there is not convergence across regions in the EU, but there is 
convergence across regions inside EU country members. 
                                                 
26 Boldrin and Canova (2000) suggest the impact of regional funds on the poorer regions has been 
marginal. 
27 Dignan (1995) also draws the same conclusion. 
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We then answered the question regarding the effectiveness of 
European wide regional policies, namely if they furthered or diminished 
convergence. We saw that structural policies tend to increase convergence 
inside the member states but are ineffective fostering regional convergence 
across the EU. Interestingly, convergence across the EU was found in the 
subsample of regions excluded from these structural policies.28 
Finally, we assessed whether policies at the country level affect regional 
income growth. We find that a larger weight of government activity and 
national investment in GDP both decrease regional growth, (primary) 
schooling has ambiguous effects though mostly negative, while trade 
openness decidedly fosters growth. In terms of geographical characteristics, 
we saw that regions in the center grow more than regions outside the center, 
and even more than regions in the periphery. This is further proof that 
regional convergence is not happening in the EU. 
From our conclusions, we contend that countries interested in 
promoting growth should open themselves to trade, and not depend 
exclusively on structural EU policies, which merely foster intra-national 
convergence and not EU-level convergence. Also, national policies of the 
sorts of government expenditure or investment have negative effects over 
regional growth. 
 
 
                                                 
28
 Other authors arrived at other suggestions as to the benefits of EU structural policies. In the 
wake of his study of the relation between income disparity and income growth,  Ezcurra (2009) 
suggests that EU programmes that reduce the degree of regional polarization in income 
distribution might boost regional growth, a possibility that has so far been unexplored in the 
design of EU regional policy. 
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Appendix 1  
Data description 
 
GDPpc: per capita regional Gross Domestic Product. Unit: Euros per capita. 
Source: European Commission (2001). 
 
Goal 1: dummy variable taking the value 1 for a region that is eligible for 
Objective 1 funding from the European Union, related to less developed 
regions. Unit: 0 or 1. Source: European Commission (2001).Regional Growth 
in European Union: National Policies, European Policies, and Geography 10 
 
Goal 2: dummy variable taking the value 1 for a region that is eligible for 
Objective 2 funding from the European Union, related to industrial regions in 
decline. Unit: 0 or 1. Source: European Commission (2001). 
 
Goal 5: dummy variable taking the value 1 for a region that is eligible for 
Objective 5b funding from the European Union, related to rural regions in 
need of diversification. Unit: 0 or 1. Source: European Commission (2001). 
 
Gov. Expenditures: share of national government spending on subsidies and 
transfers plus government consumption as a share of national GDP . Unit: 
Between 0 and 1. Source: World Development Indicators (2001). 
 
Investment: share of national investment as a share of national GDP. Unit: 
Between 0 and 1. Source: World Development Indicators (2001). 
 
Prim. School: primary school enrollment as a share of the appropriate age 
group. Unit: From 0 to slightly above 1 if adult education is present. Source: 
World Development Indicators (2001). 
 
Trade: sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share 
of gross domestic product. Source: World Development Indicators (2001). 
 
Coast: dummy variable taking the value 1 if the region has a coastline. Unit: 0 
or 1. Source: European Commission (2001). 
 
Border EU: dummy variable taking the value 1 for regions that border 
regions from other European Union countries. Unit: 0 or 1. Source: European 
Commission (2001). 
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Border non EU: dummy variable taking the value 1 for regions that border 
regions from a country outside the European Union. Unit: 0 or 1. Source: 
European Commission (2001). 
 
Core: dummy variable taking the value 1 for a region that is classified as part 
of the central area in the European Union. Unit: 0 or 1. Source: European 
Commission (2001). 
 
Periphery: dummy variable taking the value 1 for a region that is classified 
Regional Growth in European Union: National Policies, European Policies, 
and Geography 11 as part of the peripheral area in the European Union. Unit: 
0 or 1. Source: European Commission (2001). 
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Appendix 2 
Empirics 
 
 
Table 6a 
Determinants of Regional Income in the European Union  
Without Country Dummies 
Initial GDP and EU Regional Policy Eligibility Interacted 
1989- 1999 
 
Dependent variable: 
Real GDP 5-year average growth rate  Goal1 Goal2 Goal5 
All 
interactions 
     
Log (GDPt-1) 1.20** 1.23 ** 1.16 ** 1.14 ** 
 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.49 
Govexpenditures -0.23 *** -0.24 *** -0.24 *** -0.24 *** 
 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Investment -0.62 *** -0.63 *** -0.64 *** -0.64 *** 
 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Schooling 0.14 ** 0.13 ** 0.14 ** 0.13 ** 
 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Trade 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Goal1_GDP -0.05   0.01 
 0.05   0.08 
Goal2_GDP  0.06  0.04 
  0.05  0.04 
Goal5_GDP   0.08 * 0.07 
   0.04 0.05 
Constant -2.67765 -2.18471 -2.56116 -1.85111 
 7.80771 8.40040 8.13329 7.95481 
     
Country dummies No No No No 
N 328 328 328 328 
F 15.27000 14.24000 13.94000 10.62000 
pvalue F test 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
R-squared 0.23940 0.24210 0.24520 0.24670 
 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. The Appendix describes data and sources. 
For the period 1989 to 1994 we have 155 NUTS 2 level European regions: 11 NUTS for Belgium, 1 
for Denmark, 31 for Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for Spain, 22 for France, 20 for Italy,  1 for 
Luxembourg, 12 for Netherlands , 9 for Austria, 7 for Portugal, 4 for Finland and 6 for Sweden. For 
the period 1995 to 1999 we have 194 NUTS 2 level European regions: 11 NUTS for Belgium, 1 for 
Denmark, 37 for Germany, 13 for Greece, 18 for Spain, 22 for France, 20 for Italy, 1 for Luxembourg, 
12 for Netherlands, 9 for Austria, 7 for Portugal, 6 for Finland, 6 for Sweden and 31 for the UK. 
 
 
 
 
